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Abstract
It is proved that every strategy-proof, peaks-only or unanimous, probabilistic rule defined over a min-
imally rich domain of single-peaked preferences is a probability mixture of strategy-proof, peaks-only
or unanimous, deterministic rules over the same domain. The proof employs Farkas’ Lemma and the
max-flow min-cut theorem for capacitated networks.
1 Introduction
A probabilistic rule maps profiles of preference orderings to probability distributions over alternatives. Fol-
lowing the landmark paper of Gibbard (1977), a probabilistic rule is strategy-proof if the probability distri-
bution under truth-telling stochastically dominates the probability distribution under any preference mis-
representation by any agent, for all conceivable preferences of the other agents. It is well-known that the
set of strategy-proof probabilistic rules is larger than the set of strategy-proof deterministic rules; in partic-
ular all probability mixtures of strategy-proof deterministic are strategy-proof probabilistic rules. Gibbard
(1977) (see also Duggan (1996) and Sen (2011)) provides a characterization of all strategy-proof probabilis-
tic rules over the complete domain of anti-symmetric orderings. If the probabilistic rules are assumed to
satisfy additional properties such as unanimity or peaks-onlyness, then all strategy-proof probabilistic rules
are probability mixtures over the deterministic counterparts. A possible interpretation of this result is that
randomization does not “significantly” increase the scope of mechanism design relative to the deterministic
model, at least for the complete domain.
A natural question is whether the probability mixture property extends to other preference domains.
Progress has been made recently for certain domains, for instance, the binary domain (Picot and Sen (2012)),
the multi-dimensional domain with lexicographic preferences (Chatterji, Roy and Sen (2012) and dictatorial
domains (Chatterji, Sen and Zeng (2013)). The issue appears to be subtle – it has been shown that the
property holds for the first two domains but not for third, i.e., a domain on which a strategy-proof, unanimous
deterministic rule is dictatorial is, in general, not one on which a strategy-proof, unanimous probabilistic
rule is a random dictatorship.
The present paper establishes the probability mixture property for single-peaked domains. Specifically,
every strategy-proof, peaks-only or unanimous, probabilistic rule defined on a “minimally rich” single-peaked
domain is shown to be a probability mixture of strategy-proof, peaks-only or unanimous, deterministic rules
over that domain. The properties hold for the domain of all single-peaked preferences since it is minimally
rich. The first step of the proof establishes the property for a sub-domain of single-peaked domains, the
boundary domain where the peaks of all agents lie on the boundary of the set of alternatives. This part of
the proof uses Farkas’ Lemma and (a version of) the max-flow min-cut theorem for capacitated networks.
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(Roy (2010)).
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The second part of the proof extends the result to minimally rich domains using ideas from Ehlers, Peters
and Storcken (2002).
The decomposition result on the complete single-peaked domain has been independently shown in the
recent paper Pycia and Unver (2012). The proof technique in that paper is completely different from that in
the present one. It is computational and relies heavily on the characterization of strategy-proof deterministic
rules on single-peaked domains. In contrast, the proof methods of our paper are less direct and do not use
any characterization of deterministic rules on the domain. Consequently, these methods could be useful in
domains where characterizations of strategy-proof deterministic rules are difficult.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and definitions. Subsequent
sections prove results on boundary domains and minimally rich domains. For completeness, an appendix
formulates the max-flow min-cut theorem as it is used in this paper.
2 The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, denote the set of agents, who collectively have to choose an element from a finite
set A of alternatives. We assume A to be a finite subset of the real line; in particular A = {a1, . . . , am} with
a1 < . . . < am. A single-peaked preference ordering of agent i on A is a complete, reflexive, transitive and
antisymmetric binary relation Pi on A satisfying the following property: there exists τ(Pi) ∈ A, called the
peak of Pi, such that for all x, y ∈ A, if x < y ≤ τ(Pi) or x > y ≥ τ(Pi) then yPix. Let P denote the set of
all single-peaked preferences on A. A preference profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ PN is an n-tuple of single-peaked
preferences. For i ∈ N , profiles P, P ′ ∈ PN are i-variants if Pj = P ′j for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Finally, L denotes
the set of probability distributions over A.
Let D ⊆ P be an arbitrary set of single-peaked preferences. A deterministic rule is a function f : DN → A.
A probabilistic rule is a function ϕ : DN → L. Thus, ϕ(P ) is a probability distribution over A for every
profile P . For every aj ∈ A, ϕj(P ) is the probability assigned to alternative aj by ϕ(P ), i.e., ϕj(P ) ≥ 0 and∑
i∈N ϕi(P ) = 1. We identify a deterministic rule with a probabilistic rule that assigns a degenerate lottery
to every profile: for a deterministic rule f and alternative aj ∈ A, fj(P ) = 1 if f(P ) = aj and fj(P ) = 0
otherwise. We use the notations f(P ) = aj and fj(P ) = 1 interchangeably.
Let F = {fr | r = 1, . . . , t} be an arbitrary set of deterministic rules fr : DN → A. A probabilistic rule
ϕ : DN → L is a probability mixture of deterministic rules in F if there exist λr ≥ 0 for r = 1, . . . , t with∑t
r=1 λr = 1, such that ϕj(P ) =
∑t
r=1 λrfrj(P ) for all j = 1, . . . ,m and all P ∈ DN .
The probabilistic rule ϕ is strategy-proof if
∑
k:akPiaj
ϕk(P ) ≥
∑
k:akP ′iaj
ϕk(P ′) for all aj ∈ A, i ∈ N
and all i-variants P, P ′ ∈ D. Strategy-proofness requires the probability distribution from truth-telling to
(weakly) stochastically dominate the probability distribution from any preference misrepresentation, for any
preferences of the other agents. An equivalent interpretation of strategy-proofness is the following: the
expected utility under truth-telling is (weakly) greater than the the expected utility under misrepresentation
for any utility representation of the agent’s true preferences and for any preferences of the other agents. Here
we are following the approach of Gibbard (1977). Strategy-proofness of a deterministic rule is a special case
of strategy-proofness of a probabilistic rule.
A probabilistic rule ϕ satisfies unanimity if ϕj(P ) = 1 for all P ∈ D whenever τ(Pi) = aj for all i ∈ N .
This definition also extends to deterministic rules in an obvious way.
A probabilistic rule ϕ satisfies peaks-onlyness if ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′) for all P, P ′ ∈ DN such that τ(Pi) = τ(P ′i )
for all i ∈ N . An analogous definition holds for deterministic rules.
3 Results on the boundary domain
The paper provides several results on probabilistic rules on sub-domains of P. All results follow from results
on a particular sub-domain, the boundary domain DB = {Pi | Pi ∈ D and τ(Pi) ∈ {a1, am}}. The boundary
domain consists of all single-peaked preferences where an agent’s peak is either the left-extreme alternative
a1 or the right-extreme alternative am. The definition of single-peakedness implies that every preference
ordering from this set is uniquely determined by the peak; in fact, the domain consists of exactly two
orderings: a1Pia2 . . . Piam and its reverse amPiam−1 . . . Pia1. Therefore all probabilistic and deterministic
rules over this domain satisfy peaks-onliness trivially.
The next result characterizes strategy-proof probabilistic rules as probability mixtures of deterministic
strategy-proof rules.
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Theorem 1. Every strategy-proof probabilistic rule ϕ : DNB → L is a probability mixture of strategy-proof
deterministic rules f : DNB → A.
Proof For every S ⊆ N , PS will denote the boundary profile where all agents in the set S have peaks
at a1 and agents in N \ S have peaks at am. Let ϕ be a strategy-proof probabilistic rule defined on the
boundary domain. An immediate consequence of strategy-proofness is that
∑
i:i≤j ϕi(P
S) ≤∑i:i≤j ϕi(PT )
for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N and all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Let F = {fr | r = 1, . . . p} be the set of strategy-proof, deterministic rules fr : DNB → A. Suppose ϕ can
be expressed as a linear combination over F with weights λ1, . . . λp. Then for any profile PS
1 =
m∑
j=1
ϕj(PS) =
m∑
j=1
p∑
r=1
λrfrj(PS) =
p∑
r=1
λr
m∑
j=1
frj(PS) =
p∑
r=1
λr ,
so that
∑p
r=1 λr = 1 holds. Therefore, in order to show that ϕ is a probability mixture over F , it suffices to
show that λr ≥ 0 for all r = 1, . . . , p. The system of equations ϕj(PS) =
∑p
r=1 λrfrj(P
S) for all S ⊆ N and
j = 1, ...,m can be written in matrix form as Zλ = d where
• Z is an 2nm × p, 0-1 matrix with rows indexed by pairs (S, j), S ⊆ N , j ∈ {1, ...,m} and columns
r = 1, . . . , p such that the entry in row (S, j) and column r is frj(PS)
• λ is a column vector of length p with λr in row r and
• d is a column vector of length 2nm with ϕj(PS) in the row corresponding to (S, j).
The proof of the theorem consists in showing that the system Zλ = d has a nonnegative solution. By
Farkas’ Lemma, it is sufficient to show that d′y ≥ 0 for any y ∈ R2nm with Z ′y ≥ 0 ∈ Rp. Denoting the
component of the vector y corresponding to (S, j) by y(S, j), the latter system of inequalities can be written
as ∑
S⊆N
m∑
j=1
frj(PS)y(S, j) ≥ 0 for all r = 1, . . . , p. (1)
For all r ∈ {1, . . . , p} and S ⊆ N let r(S) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be such that fr(PS) = ar(S). Then fr is strategy-
proof if and only if r(S) ≥ r(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . Thus, (1) and strategy-proofness of fr, r = 1, . . . , p, are
equivalent to the following:∑
S⊆N
y(S, r(S)) ≥ 0 for all (S, r(S))S⊆N with r(S) ≥ r(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . (2)
We thus have to prove that if y ∈ R2nm satisfies (2) then
∑
S⊆N
m∑
j=1
y(S, j)ϕj(PS) ≥ 0 . (3)
This will be proved using a network-flow formulation of the problem (see Appendix). The network is
defined as follows. Consider an arbitrary numbering of the sets S ⊆ N , S1, S2, . . . , S2n with S1 = ∅ and
S2n = N . The set of vertices is
V = {α, β} ∪ {(Si, j) | i = 1, . . . , 2n, j = 1, . . . ,m}.
Here, α is the source and β is the sink. All other vertices are described by a subset of agents and an
alternative. The edges in the graph are determined by the set of deterministic rules, in the following way.
• For every r ∈ {1, . . . , p} let Er = {((Si, j), (Si+1, k)) | i = 1, . . . 2n − 1, frj(PSi) = frk(PSi+1) = 1}.
• There is an edge (α, (S1, j)) for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
• There is an edge ((S2n , j), β) for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
Now the set of edges E is the union of the sets Er, the set of m edges starting at α, and the set of m edges
ending at β. Observe that every deterministic, strategy-proof rule generates a path from the source α to the
sink β.
The capacities of the vertices of the network are defined as follows.
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• The capacity of the vertex (Si, j), i = 1, . . . , 2n, j = 1, . . . ,m is c(Si, j) = ϕj(PSi).
• c(α) = c(β) = 1.
Probabilities are thought of as the flow through the network. The paths in the network are determined
by deterministic, strategy-proof rules. The goal of the argument is to show that the maximal flow exhausts
the capacity at every vertex. This is done by using a version of the max-flow min-cut theorem.
Claim 1 The minimum capacity of a cut is equal to 1.
The proof of Claim 1 proceeds in three steps. Let C be a cut not containing α or β.
Step 1 There exist Si1 , . . . , Sim such that Sij+1 ⊆ Sij for all j = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and (Sij , j) ∈ C for all
j = 1, . . . ,m.
To prove this, observe first that there must exist some (Sik , k) ∈ C for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. To see this, let
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and consider the path (α, (S1, k), (S2, k), ..., (S2n , k), β) generated by the constant (strategy-
proof) deterministic rule frk(PSi) = 1 for all Si ⊆ N . Since C is a cut, this path must intersect C. Hence,
the cut C can be written in the form
C = {(S1,1, 1), . . . , (S1,k1 , 1), (S2,1, 2), . . . , (S2,k2 , 2), . . . , (Sm,1,m), . . . , (Sm,km ,m)}. (4)
We define a deterministic rule f by the following algorithm. Let S ⊆ N .
• If there are (Sim−1 ,m− 1), . . . , (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such that S ⊆ Sim−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Si1 , then f(PS) = am.
• Else, if there are (Sim−2 ,m−2), . . . , (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such that S ⊆ Sim−2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Si1 , then f(PS) = am−1.
• . . .
• Else, if there are (Sik−1 , k − 1), . . . , (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such that S ⊆ Sik−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Si1 , then f(PS) = ak.
• . . .
• Else, if there are (Si2 , 2), (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such that S ⊆ Si2 ⊆ Si1 , then f(PS) = a3.
• Else, if there is (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such that S ⊆ Si1 , then f(PS) = a2.
• In all remaining cases, f(PS) = a1.
It is not difficult to verify that this rule f is strategy-proof, i.e., f = fr for some r ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Since C is
a cut, the path generated by fr must intersect C, say in (S, k), so that in particular f(PS) = ak. Suppose
k < m. Then by definition of fr = f there are (Sik−1 , k−1), . . . , (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such that S ⊆ Sik−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Si1 .
Since (S, k) ∈ C, we obtain Sik = S ⊆ Sik−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Si1 for some (Sik , k) ∈ C, but then f(PS) 6= ak by
definition of fr, a contradiction. Hence k = m, which implies that there are (Sim ,m), . . . , (Si1 , 1) ∈ C such
that Sim = S ⊆ Sim−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Si1 . This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2 The capacity of C is at least 1.
To prove this, according to Step 1 we can take Si1 , . . . , Sim such that Sij+1 ⊆ Sij for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1
and (Sij , j) ∈ C for all j = 1, . . . ,m. Then
c(Si1 , 1) + c(Si2 , 2) = ϕ1(P
Si1 ) + ϕ2(PSi2 ) ≥ ϕ1(PSi2 ) + ϕ2(PSi2 ),
where the inequality follows from strategy-proofness of ϕ and the fact that Si1 ⊇ Si2 . Suppose
c(Si1 , 1) + c(Si2 , 2) + . . .+ c(Sik , k) ≥ ϕ1(PSik ) + . . .+ ϕk(PSik )
for some k ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1}. Then
c(Si1 , 1) + . . .+ c(Sik , k) + c(Sik+1 , k + 1) ≥ ϕ1(PSik ) + . . .+ ϕk(PSik ) + ϕk+1(PSik+1 )
≥ ϕ1(PSik+1 ) + . . .+ ϕk(PSik+1 ) + ϕk+1(PSik+1 ).
The second inequality follows again from strategy-proofness of ϕ and the fact that Sik ⊇ Sik+1 . It follows
from induction that
c(C) ≥ c(Si1 , 1) + . . .+ c(Sim ,m) ≥ ϕ1(PSim ) + . . .+ ϕm(PSim ) = 1.
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This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3 The minimum capacity of a cut is equal to 1.
To prove this, note that the capacity of any cut containing α or β is 1. Hence, by Step 2, the minimum
capacity of a cut is 1.
The proof of Claim 1 is now complete.
By Claim 1 and the max-flow min-cut theorem, the maximal flow through the network has value 1.
Suppose that at some flow through the network, the flow through some vertex (Si, j) is less than its ca-
pacity ϕj(PSi). Consider the cut {(Si, 1), . . . , (Si,m)}. The flow through this cut is then strictly less than∑m
k=1 ϕk(P
Si) = 1. Hence, the flow is not maximal. Thus, a maximal flow through the network exhausts
the capacity of every vertex.
The proof of the theorem can now be completed. Consider a maximal flow through the network. From
the definition of the network, a path is determined by a deterministic, strategy-proof rule. For any such rule
fr let Fl(r) denote the flow through this path. Clearly, Fl(r) ≥ 0. Hence by (2) we have
p∑
r=1
∑
S⊆N
y(S, r(S))Fl(r) ≥ 0. (5)
Consider the coefficient of an arbitrary term y(S, j) at the left-hand side of (5). The total flow at the vertex
(S, j) in the network is the sum of the flows through the vertex through all the paths. It has just been
established that the flow through this vertex must be the capacity of the vertex, i.e. ϕj(PS). Hence
∑
S⊆N
m∑
j=1
y(S, j)ϕj(PS) =
p∑
r=1
∑
S⊆N
y(S, r(S))Fl(r) ≥ 0, (6)
so that (3) holds, as required. ¥
The next result shows that Theorem 1 can be extended to unanimous probabilistic and deterministic
rules.
Theorem 2. Every strategy-proof, unanimous probabilistic rule ϕ : DNB → L is a probability mixture of
strategy-proof, unanimous deterministic rules f : DNB → A.
Proof Only minor modifications of the proof of Theorem 1 are required – specifically only of the proof
of Claim 1. Unanimity implies ϕm(P ∅) = ϕ1(PN ) = 1. Recall that in the proof of Claim 1, S1 = ∅ and
S2n = N , i.e. c(S1,m) = c(S2n , 1) = 1 and c(S1, j) = c(S2n , i) = 0 for all j 6= m and i 6= 1. Any cut that
contains either (S1,m) or (S2n , 1) must have capacity one. Moreover, any vertices in the cut of the form
(S1, j) and (S2n , i), j 6= m, i 6= 1 can be deleted from the cut without changing its capacity. Consider a
reduced network by deleting vertices of the form (S1, j) and (S2n , i), j 6= m, i 6= 1. All the arguments in the
proof of Claim 1 go through for the reduced network, i.e the minimum capacity of a cut is one. No other
modifications of the proof of Theorem 1 are required. ¥
Theorems 1 and 2 result in the following corollary for the binary domain by observing that, if A = {a1, a2},
then the complete domain consists of the two orderings a1Pia2 and a2Pia1. Hence, in that case the complete
domain coincides with the boundary domain.
Corollary 1. Suppose |A| = 2.
(a) Every strategy-proof probabilistic rule defined on the complete domain is a probability mixture of
strategy-proof deterministic rules.
(b) Every strategy-proof, unanimous probabilistic rule defined on the complete domain is a probability
mixture of strategy-proof, unanimous deterministic rules.
Corollary 1(a) was earlier proved in Picot and Sen (2012).
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4 Extensions to minimally rich sub-domains of single-peaked pref-
erences
The goal of this section is to provide extensions of the results on boundary domains to supersets of this
domain.
A single-peaked ordering Pi ∈ P is left-extreme if aj < τ(Pi) < ak implies ajPiak. Similarly, a
single-peaked ordering Pi ∈ P is right-extreme if aj < τ(Pi) < ak implies akPiaj . A domain D ⊆ P
is minimally rich if it contains all left and right-extreme single-peaked orderings. In other words, every
alternative aj is the peak of at least two orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ D where ajPiaj−1 . . . a1Piaj+1 . . . Piam and
ajP
′
iaj+1 . . . amP
′
iaj−1 . . . P
′
ia1. In particular, the domain P is minimally rich.
Theorems 1 and 2 can be extended to minimally rich domains.
Theorem 3. Let D ⊆ P be a minimally rich domain.
(a) Every strategy-proof, peaks-only probabilistic rule ϕ : DN → L is a probability mixture of strategy-proof,
peaks-only deterministic rules f : DN → A.
(b) Every strategy-proof, unanimous probabilistic rule ϕ : DN → L is a probability mixture of strategy-proof,
unanimous deterministic rules f : DN → A.
Both results in Theorem 3 derive from the fact the the outcome of a strategy-proof and peaks-only or
unanimous rule at any profile is determined completely by outcomes of the same rule at boundary profiles.
Details are provided below.
For any pair of alternatives aj , ak, conv(aj , ak) is the set of alternatives (including aj and ak) that lie
between aj and ak. A probabilistic rule ϕ : DN → L is uncompromising if
∑
j:aj∈B ϕj(P ) =
∑
j:aj∈B ϕj(P
′)
for all i ∈ N , i-variants P, P ′ ∈ DN , and B ⊆ A such that B ∩ conv(τ(P ), τ(P ′) = ∅. Suppose an agent
moves his peak from aj to ak. If a probabilistic rule is uncompromising, the probability of all subsets of
alternatives not intersecting the interval between aj and ak is unchanged. This definition was introduced in
the deterministic model by Border and Jordan (1983) and extended to the probabilistic model by Ehlers,
Peters and Storcken (2002).
Proposition 1. Let D ⊆ P be an arbitrary domain with DB ⊆ D. Let ϕ1 : DN → L and ϕ2 : DN → L be
uncompromising probabilistic rules such that ϕ1(P ) = ϕ2(P ) for all P ∈ DNB . Then ϕ1(P ) = ϕ2(P ) for all
P ∈ DN .
Proof Let aj be an arbitrary alternative and let P ∈ DN . Let S, T ⊆ N be such that S = {i | τ(Pi) ≤ aj}
and T = {i | τ(Pi) < aj}. Since ϕ1 and ϕ2 are uncompromising, ϕ1{k:ak≤aj}(P ) = ϕ1{k:ak≤aj}(PS) and
ϕ1{k:ak<aj}(P ) = ϕ
1
{k:ak<aj}(P
T ) and ϕ2{k:ak≤aj}(P ) = ϕ
2
{k:ak≤aj}(P
S) and ϕ2{k:ak<aj}(P ) = ϕ
2
{k:ak<aj}(P
T ).1
Hence,
ϕ1j (P ) = ϕ
1
{k:ak≤aj}(P )− ϕ1{k:ak<aj}(P )
= ϕ1{k:ak≤aj}(P
S)− ϕ1{k:ak<aj}(PT )
= ϕ2{k:ak≤aj}(P
S)− ϕ2{k:ak<aj}(PT )
= ϕ2{k:ak≤aj}(P )− ϕ2{k:ak<aj}(P )
= ϕ2j (P )
which completes the proof. ¥
The proof of Theorem 3 can now be completed.
Proof of Theorem 3 Ehlers, Peters and Storcken (2002) show that (i) strategy-proofness and peaks-
onlyness imply uncompromisingness and (ii) strategy-proofness and unanimity imply uncompromisingness
over P. However, their arguments carry over for any minimally rich domain. Let ϕ be a strategy-proof
and peaks-only or unanimous rule over a minimally rich domain. Theorems 1 and 2 imply that there exist
λr, . . . , λp such that ϕj(PS) =
∑p
r=1 λrfrj(P
S) for all boundary profiles PS ∈ DNB . Theorem 3 now follows
by applying Proposition 1. ¥
1Here, ϕ1{k:ak≤aj}(P ) =
∑
k:ak≤aj
ϕ1k(P ), etc.
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Observation 1. The decomposition results on minimally rich domains are not valid without the peaks-only
or unanimity assumptions. It is well-known that unilateral schemes in Gibbard (1977) are not probability
mixtures of strategy-proof deterministic rules.
Observation 2. Theorem 3 provides full characterizations of strategy-proof and peaks-only or unanimous
probabilistic rules in conjunction with the established characterizations of strategy-proof and peaks-only or
unanimous deterministic rules (see Moulin (1980), Barbera`, Gul and Stachetti (1993) and Weymark (2012)).
These results are derived for the complete single-peaked domain P. However, our Proposition 1 implies that
they hold for any minimally rich domain. Finally, in contrast to Pycia and Unver (2012), the proof in the
present paper does not rely on the characterization of deterministic rules.
Appendix
A network is a directed graph G = (V,E), with V the finite set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V the set of edges,
and with s, t ∈ V being the source (having only outgoing edges) and the sink (having only ingoing edges)
of G, respectively. The capacity of a vertex v ∈ V is a nonnegative number c(v). A flow is a mapping
F : E → R+ satisfying the following constraints:
(F1)
∑
u: (u,v)∈E F (u, v) =
∑
u: (v,u)∈E F (v, u), for each v ∈ V \ {s, t},
(F2)
∑
u∈V F (u, v) ≤ c(v) for each v ∈ V \ {s}.
(F3)
∑
v∈V F (s, v) ≤ c(s).
The value of a flow F is defined as the amount
∑
v∈V F (s, v). It represents the amount of flow passing
from the source to the sink.
A path from s to t is a sequence of vertices s = v1, . . . , v` = t such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i = 1, . . . , `−1.
A cut C is a subset of V such that for any path from s to t there is a u on this path with u ∈ C. The
capacity of a cut C, denoted by c(C), is the sum of the capacities of all its elements. Clearly, the value of
any flow is smaller or equal to the capacity of any cut. The following classical result – presented here in a
version with capacities on the vertices – is from Ford and Fulkerson (1956).2
Max-flow min-cut theorem: The maximum value of a flow is equal to the minimum capacity of a cut.
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